# Globalization and Developmental Democracy

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ABSTRACT. Problems posed to democracy by globalization may be approached with the primary focus on political institutions, or on economics, or on political culture. The problems addressed in this contribution are, first, that the interconnectedness of the world's countries calls for inter-country governing structures, which are difficult to achieve on a large and world-wide scale and, second, that global forces impede democracy within single countries. Starting from the premise that effectively addressing the second problem is necessary for making major progress in resolving the first, the contribution approaches this problem on the terrain of political culture. To this end, it draws on the theory of "developmental democracy" expounded by C.B. Macpherson to argue that citizens motivated by the counter possessive-individualist values of developmental democracy are best placed to resist anti-democratic pressures on their respective countries and are also prone to support trans-country democratic initiatives and institutions.

KEYWORDS. Developmental democracy, political culture, possessive individualism, C.B. Macpherson

From the point of view of democracy, globalization poses two generic problems: to democratize trans-country interactions and institutions and to protect democracy from global forces that severely constrain effective decision making by citizens internal to their countries. One way to sort approaches to these problem is by reference to the terrains on which putative solutions are situated. Thus, in urging the extension of boundaries of formal democratic decision making beyond individual states, cosmopolitan theorists focus on *political-institutional* opportunities and challenges. Neoliberals, by contrast, champion largely unconfined free trade between individual countries, as well as free markets within them.

They are moving on *economic* terrain. Less prevalent are orientations that depart from considerations of *political culture*. The present contribution approaches the problems in question primarily on this terrain, drawing on the work of a seminal theorist in the area, C.B. Macpherson.

Macpherson's focus was on individual countries, which are typically called "nations," even by Macpherson, though misleadingly due to the existence of bi- and multi-nation states such as his own home, Canada. Addressing this focus will set the stage for drawing on Macpherson's political-cultural theories. To adopt an individual country-centred approach in the present context is to identify the second-mentioned challenge posed by globalization – protecting democracy within countries – as crucial. In particular, success in this venture is taken as a precondition for success in cosmopolitan efforts to secure trans-state democracy. A cosmopolitan project of democratizing new or existing international institutions, such as economic forums, regional governments, or a strengthened United Nations, cannot be achieved from the top down if for no other reason than that a recalcitrant and sufficiently powerful member state can subvert such efforts or simply withdraw.

State leaders might sometimes be inclined to support cosmopolitan democratic endeavours, but they can be more reliably counted on, and be more likely to succeed, when mandated and supported by their own citizens. From a Macphersonian perspective, these things require not only that a country be democratic, but that it be democratic in a certain fashion, which, he insisted, is motivated by the values of its political culture. The remainder of this contribution will explicate and defend these claims, beginning with a brief summary of relevant theses of Macpherson.

## I. Macpherson's Approach to Democracy

Entering the arena of democratic theory in the early 1960's when the power-political, "realist" school in political science was still dominant in

North America, Macpherson produced a strong critique of this school and advanced an alternative orientation, which he called "developmental democracy." In Macpherson's first major scholarly work, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism* (1962), he described reflections in the works of British philosophers from Hobbes to Locke of a culture that in subsequent centuries was to permeate both theories of democracy and popular culture. The key components of this culture are: self-centredness, fixation on private ownership, consumerism, and greed. These attitudes, when they are dominant, describe the world view, or what Macpherson called the ontology, of a "market society."

Being self-centred carries the usual meaning of pursuing one's own interests without voluntarily making accommodations to others. Macpherson adds that in a market society, people place a very high value on possessing and respecting private property, specifically on its feature that people have a right to exclude others from the use of their property and a presumptive right to dispose of it as they please. This value becomes a fixation when the market value of a good is regarded as its most important characteristic and when virtually everything is thought of as a commodity. This includes people themselves, where one's sense of self-worth is tied up with how much one privately owns and where people locate themselves among the things they regard as their property. Consumerism is similarly taken by Macpherson in the ordinary sense that people put an excessively high priority on acquiring consumer goods, but it takes on the further meaning of a thirst for indefinite, indeed infinite, consumption. Bearing in mind that there are limits on how many consumer goods one can use, indefinite consumption is an unrealistic goal, but when combined with an attitude that sees things primarily in terms of their monetary value, the thirst for unlimited possession becomes an actual motivation in the form of greed for wealth

The next major work by Macpherson was *Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval* (1973), in which he advocated reviving aspects of the liberal-democratic tradition overshadowed by possessive individualism. Macpherson

saw liberal democracy as containing two very different and incommensurate conceptions of human nature, each part of a general social and political "ontology." In one conception, humans are thought of as packages of self-regarding desires, the satisfaction of which they try to maximize. Democracy in this conception is as expressed by power-political theorists contemporary with Macpherson. Following Joseph Schumpeter (1962), democracy for them is no more than a matter of self-interested political leaders competing with one another for the popular vote. Coexisting with this ontology is a view portended by Aristotle in his conception of a fulfilling life and later found in some liberal-democratic thinkers, notably John Stuart Mill and John Dewey, where humans aim to develop their "truly human potentials" to the fullest, and democracy is achieved to the extent that all have sufficient resources to do so. Since involvement in shaping and directing the society one shares with others is among the human potentials, active political participation beyond mere voting is an essential part of democracy.

While Macpherson did not define "truly human potentials," he nevertheless provided a number of examples in this regard. He lists the potentials "for rational understanding, for moral judgement and action, for aesthetic creation or contemplation, for the emotional activities of friendship and love, and, sometimes, for religious experience" (1973, 4). The potentials have in common that their achievement by some people does not entail that other people cannot similarly realize their potentials. Indeed, most potentials require cooperation on which, moreover, they typically thrive as people enter into valued projects with others. When lack of resources is an impediment for some (for instance, it is hard to develop friendships when one is obliged to work long hours), this is seen as a social problem capable of being addressed rather than as people being inextricably locked into zero-sum games.

The ideal of democracy in this second ontology is at odds with the narrow and competitive form of democracy that Macpherson saw as bred by and reinforcing possessive individualism. The subtitle of his book,

"Essays in Retrieval," was meant to indicate that, contrary to many radical democrats, one need not entirely jettison liberal democracy and replace it with an entirely new form of democracy, such as in Anarchist and Marxist (or at least Leninist) thinking. Rather, one can mine the history of liberal-democratic theory and practice to find elements of developmental democracy and rescue them from the possessive-individualist theory and practice that had come to dominate liberal-democratic societies.

As to just how developmental democracy has expressed itself and can be retrieved, this is entirely a matter of context. Macpherson argued that democracy can be achieved and institutionalized in a variety of fashions, depending upon existing political, cultural, economic, and institutional conditions and histories, which will vary from society to society. This stance is especially important for the undertaking of *The Real World of Democracy* (1992). This work, first given in a series of popular radio lectures in 1965, itself needs to be seen in its historical context. In the early 1960's, the Cold War was still in full force in North America and was built around a virulent form of Anti-Sovietism. Meanwhile, national liberation struggles were intensifying in the developing world. To the extent that these often involved an element of socialism, they were also subject to cold-war attack. In addition, the colonial mentality still lingered with its suspicion of nationalist sentiment in the former colonies and belief that they were unsuited to democratic government. Macpherson intended to counter all these attitudes.

The lecture's title refers to what were then labelled the first, second, and third "worlds," respectively: the liberal-democratic, industrialized countries; the Communist countries; and the newly emerging countries of the formerly colonized, developing world. Macpherson addressed each of these worlds from the point of view of its potential for enhancing democracy in his robust sense of the term. In all three he saw both advantages and disadvantages. The main advantage of the second world resided in its egalitarian economic structure; its major disadvantage was the absence of effective political rights. The advantages and disadvantages Macpherson

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saw in the first world were the reverse of those in the second. Liberal freedoms provided essential preconditions for democratic participation, but the fact that these freedoms were largely formal meant that economic inequalities and weak social services effectively foreclosed widespread democratic participation. The economic situation was even worse in the third world, but Macpherson also saw an advantage in the developing world, absent in the first and second worlds, in a sense of community growing out of being involved in nation building and national liberation.

As to prospects for democratic progress, Macpherson was optimistic. The main political institution of the second and third worlds was the single-party state. Unlike his Western political-scientific colleagues, Macpherson did not think that this institution needed to be undone to make advances in democracy in the countries of these worlds, provided their parties were both open to any citizen and internally democratic. Both these conditions were absent at the time, but Macpherson predicted that as economic hardship was overcome, discontent with the absence of political equality on the part of citizens who already enjoyed substantial economic equality would force the democratization of these parties. Regarding the first world, Macpherson predicted that the examples of socialist equality gave socialism a "moral advantage", which people in capitalist countries would recognize. Macpherson seemed to have meant by this not just that people in capitalist countries would come to be ashamed of persisting poverty in the midst of plenty in their countries, but they would see developmental democracy as both possible and desirable and begin to challenge possessive-individualist values and assumptions.

## II. The Real World of Globalization

Turning to the current epoch, it is evident that the intervening forty years have not been kind to Macpherson's predictions. Of the major Communist countries, the Soviet Union no longer exists, and China has found a

way to combine many of the worst aspects of political authoritarianism and economic capitalism. North Korea is both anti-democratic and poor, and it remains to be seen whether Vietnam will go the way of China or if Cuba can survive as a socialist country. The community feeling Macpherson admired in the third world has been severely eroded partly due to increased inequalities spawned and maintained by government corruption and brutality and partly by persisting ethnic conflict. Far from rejecting possessive individualism, the first world has witnessed a resurgence of 19th Century style neo-liberalism sustained by the capitalist market culture decried by Macpherson.

It is not the intent of this contribution to pursue the question of how damaging these failures are. The attraction of Macpherson's theory is not as predictive political science but as the wedding of political-economic and political-cultural theory to identify and critique an anti-democratic culture of possessive individualism and to articulate an alternative. Our goal, rather, is to show how democracy motivated by a developmental-democratic culture can provide an essential precondition for confronting the two generic democracy/globalization problems earlier described. Macpherson's approach of dividing the world into broad classifications according to democratic challenges and opportunities can be applied today, but with different categories. These are (I suggest): the developed liberal-democracies; the still underdeveloped regions locked into poverty, most notably large parts of Africa; and the Islamic world, which is torn between democratic and theocratic regimes and contests. India almost fits into the first category, though it includes very poor regions, and China is an admittedly significant anomaly.

Macpherson proposed his views with the first of these three worlds in mind, and this will likewise be part of our focus. Regarding the theocracy/democracy contest in the Islamic world, Macpherson's "retrievalist" strategy might be generalized to lend support to democrats who mine Islamic traditions for democratic dimensions and potentials rather than pitting Islamic religion as inescapably theocratic against entirely secular

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democratic values, as, for instance, in the study by Nader Hashemi and those whose work he summarizes in his recent book (2009). Democratic challenges in the underdeveloped world will be touched on later. Returning, now, to the original globalization/democracy problems, solutions depend upon the theses: (a) that a citizenry motivated by developmental-democratic values is best equipped to resist challenges from outside its country's borders to democracy within it, and (b) that such a citizenry is also prone to cooperate with the citizens of other countries to promote and sustain trans-country democratic institutions and procedures. Defence of the first thesis is best couched in an account of a main challenge to developmental democracy, or for that matter to any form of democracy more robust than that of the realist Schumpeterians.

III. Capitalist Challenges to Developmental Democracy

Theorists of globalization are divided on the question whether capitalism now completely transcends national boundaries or the largest capitalist enterprises still require national bases. This debate need not be entered into here, since all agree that the ability of companies to move with ease around the world and draw upon the cheapest labour and raw materials available anywhere puts them beyond the control of their host countries in important respects. Another question concerns the interaction of transnational organizations and capitalist markets. Nearly all developed capitalist countries have moved in the direction favoured by neoliberals of freeing their internal markets from regulatory and other constraints – hence the confusion, indeed panic, of their leaders in the face of current market crises. Further, and in accord with neoliberal thinking, international trade has been greatly freed from protectionist constraints from within the trading companies' host countries. They have not been entirely freed from regulations of international agencies, so perhaps there is some room for popular pressure on such agencies to rein in some of the negative effects

of free markets, but at present the presumptive baseline for economic transactions within and between countries is a free market.

Today's world of globalized capitalist markets lends itself to Macpherson's views *better* than did the advanced capitalist societies of his time. Macpherson was writing when the Keynesian welfare state was in place. Contemporary theorists appropriately challenged Macpherson on the ground that welfare economic guarantees and state provision of social services freed people to develop their potentials in the way he favoured. Today, brutal market economies and the possessive-individualist attitudes that sustain them stare us in the face at every turn, and this is not specific to particular countries due to the integration of national economies into a global market. If this aspect of globalization has provided the perspective of Macpherson with an obviously real target, however, it also poses special problems. One challenge concerns economic markets themselves. Large-scale economies admit of two main mechanisms for establishing the prices of goods and services: central command and market exchanges. Soviet planification was an ambitious version of the first mechanism. Among its failings was that even the best intentioned planners had to make unreliable estimates of consumer demand. The alternative mechanism is the market, where consumers signal preferences in market transactions. The result is that, while by no means perfect, the availability and costs of goods are more efficiently allocated and fixed than in the planned economy. If, then, the failure of Soviet-style economic planification has shown that competitive markets are indispensable for an efficient modern economy, Macpherson's hostility to markets must be tempered in a way that does not undercut his thesis about the connection of such markets to a possessive-individualist culture.

Another challenge is that the globalization of capitalist markets makes it very difficult to combat their negative dimensions at the level of one's country. The reason for this is not that the major capitalist enterprises no longer exist in national spaces, as some argue, but that attempts to improve the salaries and working conditions of employees, or to protect

or retrieve public services downsized or eliminated by tax-cutting neoliberal governments, face the threat of outsourcing of jobs, capital flight abroad, and retaliation by international trade agencies, such as tribunals of the Word Trade Organization or, in my part of the world, of the North American Free Trade Agreement. One might argue, of course, that world-wide revolution is the solution, but this was not a realistic option, even when the idea of socialist revolution was more popular than it is today.

The germ of a response to the problem posed by the apparent unavoidability of economic markets is a distinction, first made by Karl Polanyi (1977) and appropriated by Macpherson, between a market economy and a market society. An economy with a substantial role for market transactions is not by itself pernicious. It becomes so when it engenders a market society, which for Macpherson meant a society the culture of which is possessive-individualist. The crucial question to ask, then, is whether market economies must create market societies. On closer examination, it appears that markets alone do not engender a possessive-individualist culture. The additional feature of market economies that makes them turn into market societies is, I speculate (Cunningham 2005), insecurity. Self-centred behaviour is not unexpected on the part of people who must fear that there are no social resources to help them in time of need. As to a fixation on property, the possibility of dramatic rent hikes for tenants leads them to see the security of home ownership attractive. Owning one's own business is frequently motivated by a desire for control over one's economic fortunes. Self-ownership at least allows someone to walk away from an oppressive employer. One of Macpherson's hypotheses regarding greed and consumerism is that economic insecurities impede seeking or leading a meaningful life in his neo-Aristotelian sense; so they are consumerists by default.

The conclusion is that life and work in market economies should be freed from at least the most severe forms of insecurity. Contemporary interpreters of Macpherson were divided on the question of whether he

should have been seen as a social democrat or as a Marxist or some other sort of socialist. Macpherson did not see fit to label himself, though his incessant criticisms of the capitalist market suggests that if his views were best seen as social democratic, they would be of the strong variety – a moderation of "second-way" (that is socialistic) thinking, of the sort endorsed by Willie Brandt for instance, as opposed to the putative "third-way" approach which, as in Blair's Britain, was seen to be a moderation of the capitalistic "first-way." Such social democracy accepts markets as essential to modern economies, while recognizing that this does not mean one should accede to their universality. To take the most pressing current example, preservation of an environment capable of sustaining continued human life requires severe constraints on relevant market behaviour. Moreover, strong social democracy shares with full-blown socialism the insistence that state action should remove the sorts of economic insecurities that (it is here claimed) breed possessive-individualist behaviour.

With respect to the problem of realizing developmental democracy in individual countries, such social-democratic solutions confront the dilemma that implementing effective welfare state measures is impeded by the freedom globalization affords capitalist companies. Exercise of this freedom to constrain state activities of the kind that would be required to alleviate insecurity is best seen as a form of extortion or blackmail. To threaten to outsource jobs unless significant wage cuts are accepted, to relocate in another part of the world altogether unless freed from taxation pressures, to call on transnational financial agencies to demote a country's credit rating if it tries to implement confining regulations, to challenge measures aimed at protecting local manufacturing, imposing price controls, or enhancing state provision of social services in international trade tribunals – all these things are on a par with ordinary extortion: Agree to my terms or I'll see to it that bad things happen to you. One response is to try nationalizing a country's industries. This response is rarely available, if for no other reason than that almost no country's economy can be self-sufficient (though perhaps policies in Venezuela by

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Hugo Chavez are an attempt made possible, if they are possible, by his country's rich oil reserves).

Another reaction to extortionists is to call their bluff and dare them to carry through with their threats. The problem with this strategy is that the largest firms and institutions friendly to them are not bluffing, but are quite prepared to carry out their threats and often do. So a country would have to be prepared suffer the economic consequences. As in the "Battle of Britain" during World War II when the German military was surprised at the determination of British people to endure large-scale bombing destruction rather than surrender, a population would have to be prepared to reduce its living standards rather than give in to internal and external economic threats. The question now becomes one of how realistic it is to expect this. Some might think that nationalism could be counted on (and this was likely a factor in the British war-time case). In addition to the fact that nationalism is a two-edged sword with its own negative potentialities, however, it happens in today's world that nationalistic political leaders are more often than not on the pro-capitalist political right and thus usually on the side of the extortionists.

## IV. Developmental Democracy and Intra-Country Democracy

While there is probably no easy or decisive way to confront the "extortion" problem, Macpherson's theories offer one part of a solution. This has already been alluded to in the claim that to the extent that people adopt possessive-individualist life styles, this is by default due to lacking opportunities for leading meaningful lives in the sense Macpherson tried to retrieve from dimensions of liberal-democratic traditions. Unlike a life guided by possessive-individualist aspirations, a life consonant with developmental democracy is not expensive, and its rewards are intrinsic to the talent-developing activities themselves rather than residing in the wealth one can accumulate. Hence, developmental democracy has the potential

to reduce costs of living without people having to make undue sacrifices, and indeed leading preferable lives to those associated with self-centred consumerism and greed.

It also offers part of a solution to what should be apparent as the chicken-and-egg problem that standing up to extortionistic threats requires a populace that enjoys the security provided by policies that the threats impede. Chicken-egg problems (where solutions are required as means to themselves) are usually easier to address in practice than in theory. This is because most actual processes are of a spiral nature, such that small changes at the beginning can lead to larger changes in a self-building (or self-destructive) way. Thus, one can imagine initially modest, and hence affordable, ventures on the part of governments, local businesses, unions, religious organizations, schools, citizen groups, and so on, aimed at providing and expanding opportunities for people to develop the sorts of potentials Macpherson wrote of with the aim of gradually building popular attraction for such non-possessive-individualist pursuits, thus increasingly making it possible for political leaders – if, of course, the right ones are elected – to stand up to intimidation.

In anticipation of scepticism about such a scenario for being unrealistically idealistic, one might ask what the alternative is. Of course, if neoliberal philosophy is right, there is no problem here to be addressed. Utopian neoliberals will see the invisible hand of the market resolving any problems, and Social-Darwinist neoliberals will not be distressed if those who cannot triumph in a global market suffer for it. From an alternative perspective, optimistic cosmopolitans might think that the need for international regulation of global markets will call into being trans-state organizations whose leaders are committed to taming markets for the betterment of humanity in general and who will be successful in doing so. The record of neo-liberalism has not been such as to engender enthusiasm by any except those who profit from its policies, and the effectiveness of cosmopolitan leaders depends upon buy-in from leaders of individual countries and therefore (as earlier claimed) by their citizenry.

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Macpherson set himself against the neoliberals of his time, as in his critique of Milton Friedman (1973, Essay VII), and he would have seen the second tack as requiring popular support motivated by the sorts of values he espoused. This means that political efforts to gain policies that advance developmental-democratic goals must be combined with political-cultural efforts to nurture and defend these values. The following aspects of Macpherson's approach to democracy as summarized above suit it to this work.

- He does not just advocate that people lead less costly or extravagant lives, but he depicts this as a consequence of a mode of life more intrinsically rewarding and thus more attractive than the possessive-individualist alternative.

- If possessive individualism is sustained by fear-ridden economic circumstances, then this impediment to a developmental-democratic culture can be addressed by public provision of appropriate social services.

- In his deployment of the history of ideas, Macpherson offers reasons to believe that possessive individualism is not an essential part of human nature but has been constructed. This is important for countering the fatalistic belief that one flies in the face of human nature in challenging possessive individualism and policies catering to it.

- The vision he projects is secular and, in appealing to individual development, individualistic; therefore it is consistent with these aspects of liberalism. This distinguishes Macpherson's entreaties from those that require religious beliefs or that appeal to communitarian standards (such as nationalism). At the same time, thanks to the complementarity of "truly human potentials" the view is individualistic in a way that invites cooperation.

- Macpherson's approach links resistance to possessive individualism and embrace of developmentalism to his articulation of a specifically democratic ideal – the equal development of people's human potentials. Taken with the previous considerations, this means that a

Macphersonian solution to the problem at hand is consistent with liberal-democratic values.

## V. Developmental Democracy and Inter-Country Democracy

These putative advantages to Macpherson's approach are in aid of efforts taken by citizens of discrete countries to withstand anti-democratic pressures by certain aspects of globalization. It is in this way that themes and strategies inspired by Macpherson might contribute to confronting this part of the double-sided democracy/globalization issue. The second part remains to be addressed. One might imagine that some country or countries realize developmental democracy, but do not then act to strengthen democracy internationally, looking instead to profit from it selfishly, thus being like the kind and generous father at home who is a selfish and vicious gangster outside, as often depicted in fictional movies and television series.

A comment by Macpherson at the end of *The Real World of Democracy*, where he defends aid to the third world by the first, is apt with respect to such a scenario:

> Nothing less than massive aid, which will enable the poor nations to lift themselves to recognizable human equality, will now conserve the moral stature and the power of the liberal democracies (67).

This is not the only place that Macpherson saw promise in the appeal to morality. Unlike his power-political rivals, he maintained that democracy-informing world views, like all social ontologies, include motivating moral dimensions defining a worthwhile life and a good society. As components of world views, moral perspectives are not easily compartmentalized. An anti-possessive individualist, developmental-democratic ontology, if sincerely internalized, does not lend itself to the sort of schizophrenia characteristic of a psychopathic minority. As the wives and children of

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actual vicious criminals painfully find out, such schizophrenia is not usual in that case either. This anti-schizophrenia claim is an empirical hypothesis relevant to the question at hand. Shortly, a conceptual thesis in support of the same conclusion will be noted.

Not to count entirely on altruism, Macpherson held that in one respect duty and interest combine within a developmental-democratic culture. Recall that the "truly human potentials" engendered in such a democracy are ones that do not entail denial of opportunities for others, but, on the contrary, sometimes require and are often enhanced by coop-eration with others. There is no reason to suppose that such others need only be from one's own society. Indeed, a potential benefit of globaliza-tion, now taken in a benign sense of bringing the cultures, knowledge, and technological achievements unique to different parts of the globe into interactive contact with one another, is that this offers people more opportunities to lead fulfilling lives. The potential, however, can only be realized in a world of mutual respect and cooperation. Such a world would constitute globalization in a sense Macpherson would surely have applauded.

Yet another consideration in defence of the claim that those motivated by developmental-democratic values will also support international democ-racy concerns the nature of democracy itself, considered in Macpherson's sense. Unlike conceptions of democracy that limit it to the availability of formal, state voting procedures, developmental democracy involves peo-ple acting in concert to expand collective control and equal possibilities for individual self-development in all venues where they interact in ongo-ing ways. In this sense he follows John Dewey's notion of democracy as "a social idea" as opposed to just a "system of government." Such an idea affects, as Dewey puts it, "all modes of human association, the fam-ily, the school, industry, religion" (1927, 143). Why should "the world" not be added to this list? Thanks to globalization in a general sense, the world is now a locus of ongoing indirect and often direct interactions among people of virtually all countries.

If, for those who share the vision of democracy as a social ideal, democracy can transgress state/civil society boundaries within a country, it should also be able to transgress boundaries between countries. One ground for this conclusion echoes a claim by Frederick Engels that "a nation cannot become free and at the same time continue oppressing other nations" (1976, 389-90). From the point of view of this current exercise, a country is "free" to the extent that it is internally democratic in the strong sense of developmental democracy. This democracy, moreover, is secure insofar as it is actively favoured by its citizens, which means that they harbour such values as respect for each other's contribution to and enjoyment of the developmental possibilities available in the society.

It is here that a conceptual link between local and global democratic attitudes can be found. Values of the kind just noted are motivating values, values that make up part of people's characters, and such values are not easily compartmentalized. The schizophrenia described above, where democratic respect stops at a country's borders, is not only improbable but contradictory to the character-shaping values of a developmental-democratic country's citizens. The point is similar to one argued for by Martha Nussbaum when she draws support for social-democratic policies from consideration of the Aristotelian virtues and the virtuous person (1990). Her philosophical point would have resonated with Macpherson, who also looked to Aristotle in his descriptions of developmental democracy.

## VI. Concluding Remarks

Macpherson's entreaty to those in the rich part of the world to extend massive aid to those in its poor parts also bears on the challenge to democratic prospects in this component of the real world of globalization. Overcoming poverty in this domain is a vital condition for achieving the sort of robust democracy favoured by Macpherson. This, in turn, is

a precondition for currently poor countries to have a chance of partici-pating as equals with other countries in global-democratic enterprises. The task is evidently a daunting one. Macpherson observed that "A fully democratic society is only possible when both genuine and contrived scarcity have been overcome" (1973 55). In the developed, liberal-democratic world, Macpherson regarded contrived scarcity, bred of a con-sumerist culture, as a major obstacle. Nevertheless, large parts of the poor regions of the world face genuine scarcity. Citizens of the richer countries motivated by possessive-individualist aspirations cannot be expected to support the magnitude of wealth transfers required for effective relief of the world's poorest countries. Thus, once again, there is an indirect role for developmental democracy.

As to what, over and above such aid, would be sufficient to make sig-nificant democratic progress in these parts of the world, this would no doubt require, among other things, political-cultural campaigns analogous to those encouraged above. How such campaigns might be undertaken and just what forms of developmental-democratic cultures, institutions, and practices are appropriate to the poverty-ridden parts of the world are questions best addressed by those from the countries in question. Wealthy countries can economically support poor ones, and experts from these countries might offer advice on political-institutional options, but when it comes to political-cultural change, the best-placed experts are those from a society itself. It is they who understand the problems and possi-bilities inherent in their cultures and who can communicate with their compatriots in encouraging developmental-democratic attitudes.

The point is worth emphasizing because it adds another consideration about the realism of this paper's recommendations. Professional intellec-tuals, such as those, presumably, who contribute to and read this journal, need not confine themselves to disengaged analysis and prescription. As teachers, as scholars with skills of writing, researching, and public speak-ing, and as people with better access to media than most, such intellectu-als are well-placed to intervene actively in popular-level political-cultural

debates and deliberations. It would be foolish, of course, to overestimate the influence that can be exerted, and progress is no doubt easier to achieve in some societies than in others, but if one terrain appropriate for confronting the problems posed to democracy by globalization is cultural, then, for those whose professional lives demand informed, rigorous, and creative thought about matters of political culture, at least there is something to be done.

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